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HONG KONG'S FAILURE TO EXTRADITE
EDWARD SNOWDEN: MORE THAN JUST
A TECHNICAL DEFECT
By: Mark D. Kielsgard and Ken Gee-Kin Ip
As the Edward Snowden case takes legs and exhibits all
the earmarks of official misconduct and scandal,the U.S.
government continues efforts aimed at extraditing this
"whistleblower," characterizinghim as a traitorand doing damage control in the NSA. Part of this strategy includes intimidating those sovereign states that refuse to
coooperate in returningSnowden to face trial. Yet, the legal basis for these U.S. efforts is highly contentious. If
Snowden had stayed in Hong Kong and fought extradition, in all likelihood he would have prevailed. Thus, the
U.S. is left with not credible basis for complaint, and its
retaliatory diplomatic measures against other states are
without merit. This essay reviews Snowden's defenses
under the double criminaltiy principle and the political
offense exception acccording to Hong Kong law, applying
the British "incidence"standard,and casts light on a selfdefeating U.S. Policy.
On June 14, 2013, a criminal complaint was lodged by the
United States against Edward Snowden for theft of government property and espionage (unauthorised communication of national defense
information and wilful communication of classified intelligence to an
unauthorised person).1 Snowden had fled to Hong Kong S.A.R. The
U.S. government requested Snowden's extradition,2 but Hong Kong allowed him to leave for Russia.3 The Hong Kong government justified
its actions on several grounds, including technical defects in the legal
1 Criminal Complaint, United States v. Snowden, No. 1:13 CR 265, (E.D. Va. June
14, 2013), available at http://www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB436/
docs/EBB-074.pdf.; each count carries a maximum of ten years imprisonment upon
conviction, 18 U.S.C. §§ 641 (Chapter 31 - Embezzlement and Theft), 793(d), and
798(a)(3) (Chapter 37 - Espionage and Censorship) (2006).
2 Lana Lam & Tony Cheung, US Files Espionage ChargesAgainst Snowden, Calls
for His Arrest in Hong Kong, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, June 22, 2013, http://
www.scmp.com/news/world/article/1266483/us-charges-snowden-espionage-stealing-government-property?page=all.
3 Edward Snowden Leaves Hong Kong on Moscow Flight, BBC NEWS CHINA, June
23, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-23019414.
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requirements under the applicable extradition treaty and the Fugitive
Offenders Ordinance.4 There was confusion concerning Snowden's
middle name, 5 the request failed to provide Snowden's passport number, and Hong Kong apparently only received the request for the provisional arrest, not for his surrender.6 Additionally, Hong Kong alleged
that the U.S. had not replied to Hong Kong's inquiry as to whether the
offenses in the request were listed in the applicable treaty and the evidence it intended to rely on to charge Snowden. 7
The Snowden case has had significant international impact.
Though President Obama claimed that he was not going to give
Snowden undue attention,' it has resulted in substantial national debate in the U.S.9 and changes to the U.S. National Security Administration's data collection process. 1" It has also had significant impact on
U.S. relations with Russia, which eventually granted Snowden asylum
for one year.1 1 In response to what has been described as "an insult" to
the U.S.,12 a high-level summit scheduled with Russian Premier Putin
was cancelled 3 and relations between the two States have chilled. Indeed, condemnation of Russia's decision to refuse extradition even
4

Patsy Moy, US Failureto Clarify Snowden Papers Tied HKs Hands, Says Jus-

tice Chief,

SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST,

June 26, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/

news/hong-kong/article/1268958/us-failure-clarify-snowden-papers-tied-hks-hands
-says-justice-chief?page=all.
5 The name obtained by the Hong Kong Immigration is "Joseph" while the documents furnished by the US referred to "James" and the relevant court document
had "J" written on it.
6 Moy, supra note 4.
7 See id.

Shaun Waterman & Dave Boyer, Obama Hasn't Spoken with Chinese or Russian
Leaders about Snowden, THE WASH. TIMES, June 27, 2013, http://p.washington
times.connews/2013/j un/27/obama-hasnt-spoken-with-chinese-or-russian-leaders/.
9 Editorial Board, The Real Debate on Surveillance, THE N.Y. TIMES, June 10,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/11/opinion/a-real-debate-on-surveillance.
html? r=0.
10 Barack Obama Pledges Changes to Restore Trust in NSA Surveillance Programs, ABC RADIO AUSTL., Aug. 10, 2013, http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/inter
national/2013-08-10/barack-obama-pledges-changes-to-restore-trust-in-nsasurveillance-programs/1 173928.
8

11 Edward Snowden Leaves Airport, Granted Temporary Asylum in Russia: Law-

yer, ABC NEWS, Aug. 1, 2013, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-08-01/edwardsnowden-granted-asylum-for-one-year-in-russia3a-lawyer/4860072.
12 NSA Spy Leaks: Edward Snowden Leaves Moscow Airport, BBC NEWS EUROPE,
Aug. 1, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-23535524.
13

Obama Cancels Moscow Summit with Putin in Rare Snub, CBC NEWS POL.,

Aug. 7, 2013, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2013/08/07/world-obama-cancel
-russia-meeting.html.
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seems to enjoy bi-partisan support in an otherwise polarized American
political landscape.1 4 Thus far, Hong Kong (and the People's Republic
of China) has managed to avoid the ire of the U.S., but what would
have happened if Snowden had remained and fought extradition in a
local court? Is the U.S. really entitled to have Snowden extradited to
face the charges, and, if not, is their international posturing without
merit? Indeed, if Hong Kong had no duty to extradite, what complaint
can the U.S. now make of the action taken by Russia?
This essay will consider the legal implications of Snowden's
presence in Hong Kong and explore his defenses against U.S. extradition efforts. It will consider the legal authority of Hong Kong to act
under the Basic Law and review its extradition treaty with the U.S. in
context with customary practice. It will then consider Hong Kong's
duty to extradite and the validity of Snowden's defenses under the
double criminality principle and the political offense exception according to Hong Kong law.
POLITICAL RAMIFICATION
Extradition can be broadly defined as "the delivery by one government to another of persons accused or convicted of crimes committed (and justiciable) in one state or territory who have fled to
another."1 5 Before 1997, Hong Kong derived its extradition powers
from the United Kingdom. 1" "Prior to 25 April 1997, when the Fugitive
Offenders Ordinance (FOO) 17 came into force, the statutory basis for
extradition between Hong Kong and the United States was a United
Kingdom Order in Council."" "The change in the exercise of sover14

Condoleezza Rice: Russian Asylum for Snowden Is a "Slap in the Face" to U.S.,

CBS NEws, Aug. 9, 2013, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505263_162-57597737/
condoleezza-rice-russian-asylum-for-snowden-is-a-slap-in-the-face-to-u.s./.
15 See Cherk Ching v. Superintendent of Lai Chi Kok Reception Centre, [2005] 4
H.K.L.R.D. 105, 109G (C.F.I.).
16 The legal regime governing extradition between Hong Kong and non-Commonwealth countries was created under the 1870 Extradition Act. The 1989 Extradition Act, which entered into force on September 27, 1989, has repealed the 1870
Act.
17 Fugitive Offenders Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 503 (H.K.).
18 Chong Bing Keung, Peter v. The Government of the United States of America,
[2000] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 571 (C.A.). The position is summarized in the judgment of
Hartmann J in Chen Chong Gui v. Senior Superintendent of Lai Chi Kok Reception Centre, [1997] H.K.L.R.D. 1305, 1311C (C.F.I.). The judgment stated, "[oln 8
June 1972 a treaty was concluded between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States of America for the reciprocal extradition of offenders. On 21 October 1976 the treaty was ratified and by Order in
Council of that same year was brought into operation [United States of America
(Extradition) Order 1976]. Article 11(a) of the treaty stated that it should apply
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eignty on 1 July 1997 meant that international arrangements previously extended in their operation to Hong Kong would... lapse by that
date and, further, that UK legislation could not . .. any longer have
effect within Hong Kong."19 Since then, Hong Kong has been acting
under authority to negotiate and conclude agreements with third
countries in relation to the rendition of fugitive offenders under the
Basic Law.2 ° In addition, the FOO provides a unified extradition regime with all foreign countries reserving Hong Kong's power and authority for the implementation of any agreements concluded.2 1 On the
other hand, China was given a special role in the process as well. The
Chief Executive (CE) must give notice to the Central People's Government (CPG) in relation to surrender requests.2 2 The CPG can direct
the CE to take action if the matter significantly affects China's defense
and/or foreign affairs interests. 23 The rationale is that the CPG is the
sovereign power responsible for all matters affecting foreign affairs
and defense. 24 However, Hong Kong has traditionally exercised its authority without interference from the Central Government. 25 The Central Government only intervenes in extradition matters sparingly.
There is no credible evidence suggesting that the CPG has ever dinot only to the United Kingdom and the United States but to those of the United
Kingdom's overseas territories in respect of whose international relations it still
bore responsibility. Such a territory was Hong Kong and the Order in Council itself (No 2144 of 1976) extended the treaty to this jurisdiction."
19 Tiongco v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines and Another,
[1998] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 282 (C.F.I.).
20 Xianggang Ji Ben Fa (The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region of the People's Republic of China) Arts. 13, 96, 151 & 153; on April 4, 1990,
the National People's Congress of the P.R.C. adopted the Basic Law of the
H.K.S.A.R. as the Region's constitution. The Basic Law created the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region (the "H.K.S.A.R."), governed by the principle of
"one country, two systems"; see the Preamble of Xianggang Jiben Fa (recognizing
Hong Kong is an "inalienable part" of the P.R.C., but that its capitalist system is
to be "unchanged for 50 years [from July 1, 1997]."); Xianggang Jiben Fa arts. 1, 5
(H.K.).
21 See Fugitive Offenders Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 503 (H.K.).
22 See id. § 24(1).
23 See id. § 24(3).
24 Xianggang Jiben Fa arts. 13, 14 (H.K.); Fugitive Offenders (Notification Procedures) Regulation, (1997) Cap. 503L (H.K).
25 Article 59 of the Basic Law establishes an executive authority and enumerates
its powers and functions, among them, "to conduct relevant external affairs on its
own" subject to the ultimate authority of the central government of the P.R.C. See
Xianggang Jiben FA arts. 13, 62(3) (H.K.). The Basic Law authorizes the
H.K.S.A.R. government to "make appropriate arrangements with foreign states for
reciprocal judicial assistance" subject to the approval of the central government of
the P.R.C.. See Xianggang Jiben Fa art. 96 (H.K.).
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rectly overriden the Hong Kong Courts on extradition issues in the
past. Moreover, there is little reason to expect that Beijing would
choose now to circumvent Hong Kong's extradition powers under the
Basic Law.2 6 This is primarily because it might cause the Hong Kong
court to lose face and because the U.S. has a history of refusing to
extradite individuals into China.2 7 Politically, it would be prudent for
Beijing to avoid this issue, especially since Beijing can sidestep it by
citing Hong Kong autonomy. Thus, it appears that an extradition decision in the Snowden case would be based on the law of Hong Kong
alone, and a further review of political motivations is of little value.
UNITED STATES - HONG KONG AGREEMENT
Since there is no extradition treaty between the United States
and China, 28 to avoid a gap in law enforcement, the United States required a treaty to continue an extradition relationship with Hong
Kong after the Handover in 1997. The two governments created the
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of Hong Kong for the Surrender of Fugitive Offenders (the "1996 Treaty"). 29 The Chief Executive Fugitive Offenders
Order incorporated this treaty into the domestic law (United States of
America) in 1998.30 Similar to other extradition treaties, there are four
essential safeguards in the Agreement: (i) the double criminality principle, 3 which stipulates that "in all cases of extradition the act done
on account of which extradition is demanded must be considered a
crime by both parties . . . it is enough if the particular variety was
criminal in both jurisdictions;"3 2 (ii) the specialty rule,3 which re26

See Xianggang Jiben Fa arts. 13, 59, 62(3), & 96 (H.K.).

27

See, e.g., HUMAN

RIGHTS WATCH,

In the Name of Counter-Terrorism:Human

Rights Abuses Worldwide, at 11 (Mar. 25, 2003), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/
files/reports/counter-terrorism-bck 0.pdf (stating that the United States is holding
as many as thirty Uighur nationals at Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba and has refused all
Chinese requests for extradition); Sect Leader's Arrest Warrant Rejected, BBC
NEWS, July 30, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacifid407599.stm
(describing U.S. dismissal of China's request for the arrest and extradition of Li
Hongzhi, the leader of the Falun Gong religious movement).
28 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Hong Kong For the Surrender of Fugitive Offenders, U.S.-H.K.,
art. III, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-3 (1997) [hereinafter U.S.-H.K.
Agreement] (noting the absence of an extradition treaty between the United
States and the People's Republic of China).
29 Signed at Hong Kong on Dec. 20, 1996.
30 Chong Bing Keung v. Gov't of the U.S., [2000] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 571 (C.A.).
3' U.S.-H.K. Agreement, supra note 28, art. 2.
32 Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 58, 60-61 (1903).
33 U.S.-H.K. Agreement, supra note 28, art. 16.
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quires that a requesting state try a surrendered fugitive only for the
offense in respect of which it has ordered his return; 34 (iii) the prima
facie case requirement,3 5 which provides that "[a] fugitive offender
shall be surrendered only if the evidence is found sufficient according
to the law of the requested Party; '3' and (iv) the political offense exception," which states that "[a] fugitive offender shall not be surrendered if the offense of which that person is accused or was convicted is
an offense of a political character. '3' These provisions are mirrored in
the United Nations Model Treaty on Extradition ("UN Model
Treaty"). 9
WOULD HONG KONG BE LEGALLY OBLIGED TO EXTRADITE?
If Snowden had remained in Hong Kong, he would have been
surrendered into local custody and subject to long and complicated legal extradition proceedings. Extradition is a competence that fits
squarely within the sovereign rights of states4 ° and, in determining
whether Hong Kong would be legally obliged to extradite Snowden, the
contentious issues would focus on the double criminality principle and
the political offense exception.
DOUBLE CRIMINALITY PRINCIPLE
The double criminality principle is defined in article 2 of the
1996 Treaty as:
"any other offense which is punishable under the laws of
both Partiesby imprisonment or other form of detention
for more than one year, or by a more severe penalty, un34
15
36

See id., art. 16(1)(a)

Id., art. 13.
Id.

Id., art. 6.
U.S.-H.K. Agreement, supra note 28, art. 6(1).
39 United Nations Model Treaty on Extradition, G.A. Res. 45/116, U.N. GAOR,
45th Sess., Supp. No. 49A, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Dec. 14, 1990). The double criminality principle is provided in Article 2 § 1; the specialty rule is provided in Article 14
§1; the prima facie case requirement is provided in Article 5 § 2 and the political
offense exception to extradition is provided in Article 3(a).
40 See Murphy v. United States, 199 F.3d 599, 601-02 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting
Wacker v. Bisson, 348 F.2d 602, 605 (5th Cir. 1965) ("the question of the wisdom of
extradition remains for the executive branch to decide.")); Lo Duca v. United
States, 93 F.3d 1100, 1104 (2d Cir. 1996) (explaining that the Secretary of State is
under no legal duty to extradite a certified fugitive); United States v. Lui KinHong, 110 F.3d 103, 109-10 (1st Cir. 1997) (discussing the scope of the Secretary of
State's prerogative).
37
38
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less surrender for such offense is prohibited by the laws
of the requested Party.""1 (emphasis added)
The article further stipulates that, in determining whether an act is an
offense under the law of the requested Party, the conduct of the person
shall be examined by reference to the totality of the underlying criminal conduct, without reference to the elements of the offense prescribed by the law of the requested Party. 42 Also, the article specifies
that "[a]n offense shall fall within the description .

.

. whether or not

the laws of the Parties place the offense within the same category of
offenses or describe the offense by the same terminology."" Thus, this
militates "against the possibility of an excessively formalistic application of the treaty based upon the semantic description of an offense
(which will obviously differ depending on the legal systems and languages concerned) rather than its practical nature.""4
Of the two charges Snowden faced, the offense of theft of government property 45 would not cause great difficulty because article
2(1)(x) of the 1996 Treaty provides that surrender of fugitive offenders
shall be granted for obtaining property by theft or similar offenses."6
In addition, the Hong Kong counterpart of theft as provided in section
2(1) of the Theft Ordinance (Cap 210) states that a person commits
theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with
the intention of permanently depriving the other of it. 4 7 The U.S.

would easily make out a prima facie case for the double criminal nature of the theft charge.
On the other hand, the espionage charges would spark greater
controversy, as Hong Kong effectively has no foreign policy competence
(reserved for the CG), yet maintains a semi-autonomous state as a
Special Administrative Region. Moreover, although national security
provisions are referenced in the Basic Law (under article 23)4" no imU.S.-H.K. Agreement, supra note 28, art. 2 § 1(xxxvi).
Id., art. 2 §3. Also, it is noted that Hong Kong courts have followed the England
jurisprudence in replacing a stringent "double criminality test" in favor of a more
relaxed "conduct test"; see Lawrence Louis Levy (alias John William Dearman) v.
Attorney General, [1987] H.K.L.R. 777, 779 (C.A.). In that case the applicable test
is whether the conduct of the accused would have constituted a crime falling
within one or more of the descriptions included in the list of extraditable offenses.
43 U.S.-H.K. Agreement, supra note 28, art. 2 § 4(a).
'" U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Revised Manuals on the Model Treaty on Ex41

42

traditionand on the Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, TI20

(2002).
45 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2011).
46 U.S.-H.K. Agreement, supra note 28, art. 2 § 1(x).
4' Theft Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 210 § 1 (H.K.).
48 Article 23 of the Hong Kong Basic Law provides that "[tihe Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason,
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plementing legislation has been passed.4 9 Arguably, there is no Hong
Kong equivalent charge to the U.S. Espionage Act. However, the U.S.
could propose that Hong Kong's colonial era Official Secrets Ordinance
(OSO) is the equivalent of the U.S. Espionage Act, whether authorized
under the Basic Law or not.5 ° The offense of damaging disclosure of
defense information is dealt with in section 15 of the OS0 5 1 and the
disclosure of security and intelligence information is prohibited under
section 13 of the OSO. 52 Nevertheless, Snowden could maintain that
the OSO, being holdover legislation from British rule and largely prosecession, sedition, subversion against the Central People's Government, or theft
of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or
bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or
bodies."
49 DANNY GITTINGS, INTRODUCTION TO THE BASIC LAW 106 (Hong Kong Univ.
Press
2013) provides the following account: "[a]n extreme example of this came during
more than 180 hours of scrutiny by the Legislative Council of the National Security (Legislative Provisions) Bill in early 2003. This controversial bill primarily
sought to implement the requirement in Article 23 of the Hong Kong Basic Law for
Hong Kong to enact comprehensive laws protecting national security. But it
aroused so much opposition during the legislative process that the government
was forced to table three revised versions of the bill and 51 amendments, some
making major changes to its original proposals. However, all these changes failed
to appease the bill's critics. Instead, the highly publicized process of legislative
scrutiny arguably only intensified public opposition. As a result, after a massive
street protest by more than half a million people on 1 July 2003, legislators who
had previously promised to support the bill change their minds. Lacking enough
support in the Legislative Council to secure its enactment, the executive was left
with no choice but to withdraw the bill just days before it was due to be put to a
vote."
50 By articles 8 and 18 of the Hong Kong Basic Law, it preserved in force in
the
H.K.S.A.R., inter alia the laws previously in force in Hong Kong, including ordinances and subsidiary legislation, subject to amendment by the H.K.S.A.R.
legislature.
51 Defence Information, (1998) Cap. 521, § 1 (H.K.). This Ordinance provides that
"[a] person who is or has been a public servant or government contractor commits
an offense if without lawful authority he makes a damaging disclosure of any information, document or other article relating to defence that is or has been in his
possession by virtue of his position as such."
52 Security and Intelligence Information-Members of Services and Persons
Notified, Cap. 521, § 13 (H.K.) This section provides that (1) A person who is or has
been (a) a member of the security and intelligence services; or (b) a person notified
that he is subject to the provisions of this subsection, commits an offense if without
lawful authority he discloses any information, document or other article relating
to security or intelligence that is or has been in his possession by virtue of his
position as a member of any of those services or in the course of his work while the
notification is or was in force.
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tecting British interests, is no longer applicable,5 3 or that the logical
equivalent portion of the law would be section 16 of the OSO. Section
16 of the OSO is clearly obsolete as it protects against "disclosures
[which] endanger the interests of the United Kingdom"5 4 and defense
competence is now within the ambit of the CG, not the Hong Kong
government (or the UK). Failure to pass implementing legislation to
article 23 of the Basic Law is thus key in the determination of this
case.5" Snowden can maintain that this lacuna in Hong Kong law
would be fatal to the U.S. claim. Alternatively, he could assert that, as
a whistle-blower, he was not disclosing damaging information-an essential element of the offense under the OSO-but safeguarding public
interests by reporting on illegal U.S. government conduct.56 However,
he would be unlikely to prevail because the OSO legislation is generally considered valid law post-Handover, 7 and the U.S. could make
out a prima facie case that the information provided was damaging, as
it maintains Snowden was not a whistle-blower, did not reveal any
53 See Johannes Chan, National Security and the Unauthorized and Damaging
Disclosure of Protected Information, in NATIONAL SECURITY AND FUNDAMENTAL
FREEDOMS: HONG KONG'S ARTICLE 23 UNDER SCRUTINY (Hualing Fu, Carole Petersen & Simon Young eds., Hong Kong Univ. Press 2005) ("[t]he ... Official Secrets
Act 1911 and its subsequent amendments were extended to Hong Kong by Order
in Council and formed part of Hong Kong law until 1992, when the Official Secrets
Act 1989 was extended to Hong Kong by the Official Secrets Act (Hong Kong) Order 1992. The English provisions were repealed by section 27 of the Official
Secrets Ordinance, which was enacted in 1997 and modelled on the Official
Secrets Act 1989.")
54 Official Secrets Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 521, 8-9, § 16(2)(a) (H.K.).
55 See National Security (Legislative Provisions) Bill, C149 § 10 (H.K.) (failed bill
which sought to Amend the Crimes Ordinance, Official Secrets Ordinance and the
Societies Ordinance pursuant to Article 23 of the Basic Law, making it an offense
for a public servant or government contractor to make, without lawful authority, a
damaging disclosure of any information, document or other article that relates to
the affairs concerning the H.K.S.A.R. that are the responsibility of the Central
Authorities; and that have come into their possession by virtue of his position),
available at http://www.basiclaw23.gov.hk/english/download/s3200307077.
56 See Barton Gellman, NSA Broke Privacy Rules Thousands of Times Per Year,
Audit Finds, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/nsa-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-per-year-audit-finds
/2013/08/15/3310e554-05ca-1le3-aO7f-49ddc7417125_story.htm (identifying 2,776
NSA violations between April 2011 and March 2012); Charlie Savage, N.S.A.
Often Broke Rules on Privacy,Audit Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2013, http://www
.nytimes.com/2013/08/16/us/nsa-often-broke-rules-on-privacy-audit-shows.html;
Ken Dilanian, National Security Agency Broke Privacy Rules, Documents Show,
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-nsa-privacy-2013
0817,0,4332 110.story.
57 See Johannes Chan, supra note 53, at 254.
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wrongdoing by NSA, and that information, particularly dealing with
European allies, 8 was damaging to U.S. foreign interests.
Even if Snowden could establish that the OSO was invalid after the 1997 Handover, he would still face the theft charge and could
be extradited under the double criminality principle. If this scenario
played out, he could only be subsequently prosecuted on the theft
charge, as inclusion of the espionage offenses would be prohibited
under the specialty principle. 5 9 Thus, Snowden would probably face
extradition to the U.S. on at least the theft charge, unless he could
establish that the theft he committed was of a political nature.
POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION
The political offense exception has a history dating back to the
19th century 60 and has been justified on several grounds. First, it is
premised on the belief that individuals have a "right to resort to political activism to foster political change. 6 1 Secondly, the exception
manifests the requirement of fairness that individuals (e.g., unsuccessful rebels) should not be returned to countries where they may be
subjected to unfair trials and punishments because of their political
opinions.6 2 Thirdly, the exception shows respect for the right of selfdetermination, and foreign governments should not intervene in the
internal political struggles of other nations.6 3 This exception is commonly included in extradition treaties and is provided in the UN
58 Chris Bucktin, Edward Snowden: European Union Furiousat Claims America

Bugged its Offices and Computers, MIRROR NEWS (Jul. 1, 2013), http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/edward-snowden-european-union-furious-2014009
(noting that European Union President, Martin Schulz, stated that if America
had indeed bugged their offices it would have a "severe impact" on relations between the EU and the US.).
59 See U.S.-H.K. Agreement, supra note 28, at art. XVI § 2 (agreeing to the speciality rule where the US would be obliged to forego prosecution on the espionage
count if Snowden was only extradited on the theft charge).
60 Lloyd W. Grooms & Jane M. Samson, The Political Offense Exception to Extradition:A 19th Century British Standardin 20th Century American Courts, 59 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1005, 1009 (1984).

61 See Cindy V. Schlaefer, American Courts and Modern Terrorism:The Politics of
Extradition, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 617, 622 (1981); In re Doherty, 599 F.
Supp. 270, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
62 CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 425
(1974); CHRISTINE VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENCE EXCEPTION TO
EXTRADITION 100 (1980); Garcia-Guillern v. U.S., 450 F.2d 1189, 1225, 1238 (5th
Cir. 1971).
63 VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 62, at 158, 204; Schlaefer, supra note 61, at
622.
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Model Treaty at article 3(a).6 4 It is also contained in article 6(1) of the
1996 Treaty which states: "A fugitive offender shall not be surrendered if the offense of which that person is accused or was convicted is
an offense of a political character."
According to international practice there are two distinct categories of political offenses: "pure political offenses" and "relative political offenses." 65 "Pure political offenses" are acts aimed directly at the
government and are distinguishable from ordinary crimes. These offenses include treason, sedition, and espionage and do not violate the
private rights of individuals.6 6 In Quinn v. Robinson, the Court explained, because these offenses are often specifically excluded from the
list of extraditable crimes (in extradition treaties), courts seldom deal
with these offenses and it is generally agreed that they are not
extraditable. 6 7
Pure Political Offense
The two espionage charges filed against Snowden would fall
within this category. Any uncertainty concerning the applicability of
the political offense exception to the espionage charges, such as it is,
lies in recent changes of practice. As noted, "pure political offenses"
such as espionage are rarely extraditable because, inter alia, the practical reason that they are not named in the treaties made under the socalled "list" system.6 8 However, "pure political offenses" have arguably
been brought within the ambit of UK extradition law with their adoption of the "no list" system whereby extradition is determined by the
gravity of the offense, not inclusion on the list.6 9 Yet, the UK's departure from the "list" system which occurred after the Handover of
1997,70 is not binding on Hong Kong. Additionally, Hong Kong has not
United Nations Model Treaty on Extradition, supra note 39.
See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 793 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Karadzole v.
Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198, 203 (9th Cir. 1957)); Manuel Garcia-Mora, The Nature of
PoliticalOffenses: A Knotty Problem of ExtraditionLaw, 48 VA. L. REV. 1226, 1230
(1962); Grooms & Samson, supra note 60, at 1009.
66 Quinn, 783 F.2d at 793.
67 Id. at 793-94.
68 Extradition law was treated as inapplicable in the case of a convicted spy in R v.
Governor of Brixton Prison, ex parte Soblen, [1963] 2 Q.B. 243; Also acts of international espionage were not considered to be political offenses in R v. Governor of
Pentonville Prison, ex parte Rebott, [1978] L.S. Gaz. R. 43 (C.A.).
64
65
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4.10 (2d ed. 2000).
70 The double criminality standard in the 2003 Extradition Treaty (Extradition
Treaty between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, U.S.-U.K., Mar. 31, 2003, S. TREATY Doc. No.
108-23 (2003)) differs from the 1972 Extradition Treaty (Extradition Treaty be-
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abandoned the list system and Hong Kong continues to maintain lists
of offenses in its treaties. Moreover, there is no provision for "pure political offenses" in its list of extraditable charges in the 1996 Treaty.7 1
It strains credulity to conclude that the local court would constructively imply the inclusion of espionage to the 1996 Treaty, as all other
political offenses are specifically excluded. Moreover, constructive inclusion of espionage would render the political offense exception (article 6 (1)) of the 1996 Treaty meaningless.7 2 Espionage has long been
considered a pure political offense.7 3
Furthermore, relying on the pure political offense exception,
Snowden can advance a claim that the political nature of his offense
would preclude a fair trial. The alleged effects of his conduct "are likely
to give rise to a heat of public passion making an orderly and just trial
at best a remote possibility."7 4 This is further exacerbated by "the observation ... that these offenses are regarded as such only by the society against which they are directed."7 5 The espionage charges in
question "lack the essential elements of ordinary crime, as, for instance, malice in the technical criminal law sense of this term"7 6 and,
on a pragmatic note, Snowden as a political offender poses less danger
to the security of Hong Kong (if provided asylum) than those accused

tween the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, U.S.-U.K., art. X, June 8,
1972, 28 U.S.T. 227), which used an enumerative method that listed specific extraditable offenses in an Annex to the treaty. Under the 2003 Extradition Treaty extraditable offenses are not enumerated in and limited to a specific list, but rather
are expanded to any crime that is recognized in both nations as punishable by a
predetermined penalty.
71 U.S.-H.K. Agreement, supra note 28, at art. 2.
72 An account is provided in CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
VOLUME II- MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL ENFORCEMENT MECHANIsMs 356 (3d ed.

2008) ("[U]nder the enumerative approach, the extradition treaty and the relevant
extradition legislation list all offenses for which surrender must be granted, subject to limitations and exceptions. If the offense is not listed, there will be no extraditable offense and the fugitive will not be surrendered.").
73 Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 793 (9th Cir. 1986); Garcia-Mora, supra note
65, at 1234; Steven Lubet & Morris Czackes, The Role of the American Judiciary
in the Extradition of Political Terrorists, 71 J.
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L. & CRIMINOLOGY 193, 200

(1980).
74 Manuel Garcia-Mora, Treason, Sedition and Espionage as Political Offenses
under the Law of Extradition, 26 U. PITT. L. REv. 65, 85 (1964).
75 See id.
76 See id.; see
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of ordinary crimes." Thus, Snowden would not be subject to extradition to the U.S. for the espionage charges pursuant to article 6(1)
under a "pure political offense" exception.
Relative Political Offense
The remaining charge, theft of government property, may be a
relative political offense and exclude extradition despite the double
criminality principle discussed above. Relative political offenses include "otherwise common crimes committed in connection with a political act" or "common crimes ...

committed for political motives or in a

political context."7 " In Hong Kong, no statutory definition is provided
in either the FOO or the 1996 Treaty, and few states have attempted
to define it in their extradition law.7 9 The U.K. has no statutory or
generally accepted judicial definition."0 Nevertheless, broadly defined,
a relative political offense is one that requires a nexus between the
offense and the political motivation behind its perpetration. 1 Additionally, "in UK law, the offender's political motivation alone is not
decisive. The crime must have [been] directed against a particular government and not against government in general."8 2 Specifically, "the
crime must have been directed against the government of the request77 Garcia-Mora, supra note 65, at 85; see Cass., sez. un., 5 mar. 1949, n. 3, 101

Giur. it. 1975, 281 (It.).
78 Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 794 (9th Cir. 1986).
79 Roda Mushkat, JurisdictionalIssues in a "Highly Autonomous Region"-The
Case of Hong Kong, 42(1) INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 11, 33 (1993).
80 STANBROOK & STANBROOK, supra note 69, at 4.09; see Schtraks v. Government
of Israel, [1964] A.C. 556 (H.L.) 589 (U.K.); Cherif Bassiouni, The Political Offense
Exception in Law and Practice, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL
CRIMES 408 (Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1975).
81 The judicial approaches could be categorised into three distinct groups: (i) the
French "objective" test; (ii) the Swiss "proportionality" or "predominance" test; and
(iii) the Anglo-American "incidence" test. The early French test considered an offense non-extraditable only if it directly injured the rights of the state and the
motives of the accused had been considered irrelevant. The test essentially protects only pure political offenses and is not useful in defining whether an otherwise common crime should not be extraditable because it is connected with a
political motive. On the contrary, the Swiss test examines the political motivation
of the offender, the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime and
applies either the proportionality between the means and the political ends standard or a predominance of the political elements over the common crime elements.
See Garcia-Mora, supra note 65, at 1249-54; The Anglo-American "incidence" test
will be addressed in subsequent passages.
82 STANBROOK & STANBROOK, supra note 69, at 4.10(5); Re Meunier, [1894] 2 Q.B.
415 (The offense was said to have been committed for anarchistic reasons.).
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ing State as the dominant motive." 3 Lord Diplock held that the idea of
a political offense should be "confined to the object of overthrowing or
changing the government of a State or inducing it to change its policy,
or escaping from its territory the better to do so; [and the object should
be] sufficiently immediate to justify the epithet 'political."'' 4
Clearly, Snowden's objective was to induce the U.S. government to change domestic policy. However, courts are wary of attempts
to enlarge the scope of the political offense exception. In the Budlong
case 5 for example, the fugitives (charged in the U.S. with burglary)
had entered a government building in order to gather information
from official files which might be of value to the Church of Scientology
in its campaign for more favorable tax treatment.8 6 It was argued that
this was a political offense since it was committed with the object of
inducing the government to change its policy. Judge Griffiths held that
"the offense was not committed within the framework of a struggle for
power within the State. The applicants did not order these burglaries
to take place in order to challenge the political control or government
of the United States but simply to advance the interests of the Church
of Scientology."8 7 It was "ridiculous to regard the applicants as political refugees seeking asylum in this country."8 s The Budlong case is
one with a profit motive parading as political activism.
Distinguishing Snowden, he does not possess a profit motive,
he did not engage in the offending behavior for personal gain or the
gain of others, but to stop what he regarded as illegal government behavior and invasion of privacy interests in the U.S. Snowden's motive
was "to rid his people of an intolerable oppression or, at any rate, to
change a given political situation which he honestly regards as unjust
and arbitrary."8 9 Snowden "committed his acts because of his political
beliefs and convictions." 90 Hence, the type of intent which is necessary
to these crimes may be regarded by the extradition law of Hong Kong
as "only incidental to an overriding political motive."9 1 Moreover, the
subjects of the charges are "directed against the political and social
organization of the State, without in any way affecting the private
supra note 69, at 4.10(5); Cheng v. Governor of
Pentonville Prison, [1973] A.C. 931 (H.L.); see also R v. Governor of Belmarsh
Prison, ex parte Dunlayici, THE TIMES, 2 August 1996.
84 Cheng v. Governor of Pentonville Prison, [19731 A.C. 931 (H.L.) 945.
85 R v. Pentonville Prison Governor, ex parte Budlong, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1110
(Q.B.).
86 STANBROOK & STANBROOK, supra note 69, at 4.35.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 1124.
89 Garcia-Mora, supra note 74, at 87.
90 Id. at 88.
83 STANBROOK

91 Id. at 87.
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rights of individuals."9 2 His actions were directed against the requesting state, namely the U.S. Thus, he would predictably satisfy the political nexus requirement.
In addition to prohibiting extradition for offenses of a political
character, article 6(2) of the 1996 Treaty expressly excludes from the
reach of the exception an offense for which both parties are obliged
pursuant to a multilateral international agreement to extradite the
person sought.9 3 The article likewise excludes murder or other willful
crimes against the Head of State of the United States, China, or a
member of the Head of State's immediate family. Snowden's charges
do not fall within either of these categories.
Under the Anglo-American "incidence" test, Snowden would
face the preliminary and essential hurdle of the existence of a political
disturbance.9 4 Political disturbance relates to the measure of politically motivated unrest which exists in the requesting state at the time
of the operative behaviour. This varies according to jurisdiction and
requirements may range from mere fractious dissent 95 to a shooting
war.9 6 Under the traditional Anglo-American test, extradition will
only be denied if the acts are "committed during the progress of actual
hostilities between contending forces" and are "closely identified" with
the uprising "in an unsuccessful effort to suppress it."97 The "incidence" test has two components-the uprising requirement and the
nexus requirement. The uprising component "makes the exception applicable only when a certain level of violence exists and when those
engaged in that violence are seeking to accomplish a particular objecId.; In re Giovanni Gatti, Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Grenoble,
Jan. 13, 1947, Ann. Dig. 1951, 145, 70 (Fr.).
92

93 See, e.g., aircraft hijacking pursuant to The Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S.
105; aircraft sabotage pursuant to the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564,
974. U.N.T.S. 177; crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomats, under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14,
1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; and hostage taking, pursuant to the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 1316
U.N.T.S. 205.
94 Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986) (the Court of Appeals agreed to
the extradition of Quinn for murder because it found there was no uprising in
mainland Britain); see also Mary Landergan et al., Report Recommending the Re-

form of the Law of InternationalExtradition, by the Committee on Immigration
and Nationality Law, 1986 REC. A.B.A.C.N.Y. 587, 592-93.
95 See R v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Koczynski [1955] 1 Q.B. 540
(Eng.).
96 See In re Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. 149.
97 In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972, 997, 1002 (N.D.Cal. 1894).
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tive."' s The nexus component means the offense must occur in the context of an uprising and be limited by the geographic confines of the
uprising, contemporaneous with the uprising and causally or ideologically related to the uprising.9 9 This is a fairly high standard, which
Snowden would be unable to meet. There is no ongoing uprising taking
place in the U.S., only disparate political rhetoric, so Snowden would
fail to meet the first prong of the Anglo-American "incidence" test.
Having failed the first prong under the Anglo-American standard, the
second prong would be moot.
The U.K. law, however, incorporates a more lenient interpretation of relative political offenses and moderates the requirement of the
existence of a political disturbance. Although the English law shared
the common origin in In re Castioni,1 ° ° the rigid "two-party struggle"
requirement of the British incidence test has not survived.' ° ' In the
1950s, British courts considered other factors, where "political offenses
...[had to] be considered according to the circumstances existing at
the time."' 2 Instead of a distinct uprising, the new British "incidence"
test requires some "political opposition . . .between the fugitive and
the requesting State"' 3 and "incorporates an examination of the motives of the accused and the requesting country in those situations in
which the offense is not part of an uprising."' 4 Based on that, "the
United States' interpretation of the exemption is, in some ways, the
strictest, for the fugitive has no prospect of success unless a political
disturbance is proven."105 Under U.K. law, Snowden is likely to prevail, as his motives and opposition to certain government policy have
never been contested and there is a direct nexus between the conduct
complained of and Snowden's intent to change government policy. Dispensing with the political disturbance requirement obviates the only
barrier for use of the relative political offense exception for the theft
charges.
Thus, the Hong Kong judiciary is confronted with two opposing
doctrines: a rigid application of the traditional Anglo-American test of
"incidental to and forming part of a political disturbance," and the
British "incidence" test of a broader perception of political crimes as
98 Quinn, 783 F.2d at 807.
99 Id. at 809.
100 In re Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. 149.
'01 Quinn, 783 F.2d at 796.
102 Id.; Regina v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Kolczynski [1955] 1 Q.B.
540 at 549 (Eng.).
103 Schtraks v. Government of Israel and Others, [1964] A.C. 556, 591 (H.L.).
104 Quinn, 783 F.2d at 796.
105
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those committed in association with a political object. 106 The question,
therefore, turns on which precedent Hong Kong would resort to for guidance. Article 8 of the Hong Kong Basic Law provides that law as it
existed in Hong Kong on 1 July 1997, including the common law, shall
be maintained. The "common law" in article 8 includes any relevant
pre-1997 English precedents. Hence, "while not binding unless they
had been expressly adopted by Hong Kong courts already, [precedents]
would remain indirectly authoritative, arguably to a degree more than
mere persuasiveness, as a statement of English law that had not been
superseded by Hong Kong law nor deemed to be in contravention of the
Basic Law."1 ° 7 Therefore, as the British "incidence" test was established before 1997, it presumptively prevails over the traditional Anglo-American test and is the applicable standard in the Snowden case.
Accordingly, the non-existence of a political disturbance in the United
States would not bar Snowden's claim of protection for the theft charge
under the relative political offense exception of the 1996 Treaty.
CONCLUSION
Snowden would have a colorable case for avoiding extradition
on the double criminality principle for the espionage charges. He also
has a strong case for both sets of charges under the political offense
exception-the espionage charge as a pure political offense and the
theft charges as relative political offenses. Due to his sincere desire to
influence political change (by calling for the U.S. government to live up
to constitutional obligations to ensure privacy interests), rather than a
motivation for profit or an intent to incite violence, if this case does not
fall within the political offense exception, what case would?
As the new century advances, political-strategic paradigms
continue to shift and presumed U.S. omnipotence wanes. The U.S.'s
international initiative relative to the Snowden case is self-defeating,
as it fails to occupy high moral ground and lacks legal legitimacy. Despite sabre rattling and efforts at intimidation, extradition is a matter
of state sovereignty and will be decided as an issue of domestic law and
practice. The law of Hong Kong, inextricably linked with English law
for more than 100 years, favors a less rigid approach to the political
offense exception than the U.S. The Edward Snowden case presents a
classic example of the divergence of these two great common law systems and exposes the flaws in the current geopolitical U.S. strategy
concerning this singular case. Indeed, once the legal bases have been
106
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exhausted, the only rationale left for extradition is an uneasy resort to
extra-judicial political justifications, an untenable posture for a nation
priding itself on rule of law.

